My response to the UN CEDAW Committee’s Views on the prosecution of Eleanor de Freitas

By Alexander Economou. I am the person referred to as “A.P.” in the Committee’s Views. Last updated 11 November 2026.

On 23 October 2026 the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) adopted its Views on Communication No. 184/2022 (document CEDAW/C/93/D/184/2022). The complaint was brought against the United Kingdom by the father of Eleanor de Freitas, who is called “E.F.” in the Views. The Committee announced its decision in a press release on 5 November 2026.

The Committee found that the United Kingdom violated E.F.’s rights in two ways. The first was that its law allowed the person she had accused of rape to bring a private prosecution against her for perverting the course of justice, without effective safeguards at the outset (paragraphs 9.9 and 9.10). The second was that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) took over that prosecution and continued it (paragraph 9.16). The Committee recommended, among other things, that such prosecutions should be brought only by public prosecutors, and that her father should receive reparation (paragraph 10).

I brought the private prosecution in August 2013, and the CPS took it over in December 2013. I was not a party to the complaint to the Committee.

Ms de Freitas’s death was a tragedy. I take no issue with the Committee’s concern that people should not be deterred from reporting sexual offences. This page is about the factual record and the legal reasoning. It sets out six points on which the Views are incomplete, each with its source. Numbers in brackets are paragraphs of the Views. “The DPP’s statement” means the public statement made by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) on 9 December 2014. Where I rely on documents from the proceedings, I link to copies of them.

1. Did the Committee decide that the rape allegation was true?

No. The Committee says it “is not called to determine the merits of the decision to prosecute” (9.5).

There were two complaints. E.F. reported rape, and I reported that her allegation was false (2.2). The police took no further action on her complaint (2.3) and never investigated mine (the DPP’s statement). No court has ruled on either complaint.

The Views do not reflect that. Their subject line describes me as the “alleged perpetrator” and E.F. as “the victim of rape”, and paragraph 9.8 speaks of “survivors” and of contact with “their abuser”. The lawyers who represented her father before the Committee have themselves told Parliament that the original complaint “was never proven either way” (written evidence of the Centre for Women’s Justice, paragraph 2).

The Committee found indirect discrimination (9.9) without weighing the interests of the person accused, which are reputation and the presumption of innocence. The United Kingdom told the Committee that its law pursues “a legitimate balance” between protecting victims of sexual violence and safeguarding people from the serious harm caused by false allegations (6.14). The Views do not assess that balance. They also cite no evidence that these prosecutions, which are exceptional (6.10), deter reporting.

The CPS’s own guidance already strikes the balance. CPS guidance on these cases, reviewed in April 2023, says that victims “should not be deterred from reporting their allegations”, that such prosecutions “will be extremely rare”, and that prosecutors must “strike the right balance between ensuring genuine victims are believed and not criminalised whilst recognising the need to protect the innocent from false allegations”.

2. Did the prosecution cost E.F. her anonymity and her support?

Less than the Views suggest. They treat both losses as “uncontested” (9.7), but the facts are narrower.

Anonymity. As far as I am aware, E.F. was never named in the press or online during her lifetime. The Views repeat, as part of her father’s account, that I “made extensive representations about her online” (2.6). That is an allegation, not a finding, and there is no evidence that I or anyone else named or identified her publicly before her death. She was first identified publicly after her death, in statements made to the press by her father.

Reports of the criminal proceedings could lawfully have named her, because the anonymity given to complainants does not extend to reports of other criminal proceedings (section 1(4) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992; R v Beale [2017] EWCA Crim 1012, paragraph 13). None appeared.

A criminal court may withhold a defendant’s name only in rare circumstances, but a real and immediate risk to the defendant’s life is one of them (Judicial College guidance, section 4.4). E.F. had solicitors and counsel throughout, and no application of that kind was made.

Support. The Views say that her counselling was reduced and that she was told not to discuss anything relevant to the trial (2.5). The Committee’s press release says the proceedings “severely affected her access to support services”. Three points put that in context.

  • What was restricted was counselling from a rape crisis centre about the alleged rape (2.5, footnote 1). Her psychiatric care was a separate matter: the Views refer to her doctor (2.5), and the DPP’s statement refers to her consultant psychiatrist.
  • The Views identify no court order and no direction from either prosecutor. Under the practice guidance then in force, the prosecution has no authority to prevent therapy, and the decision belongs to the person and the provider (paragraphs 4.3 and 11.1).
  • The same guidance tells therapists to avoid discussing the evidence a person will give, and warns that records may have to be disclosed (paragraphs 11.9 and 3.13 to 3.15). That caution applies in any pending trial. It would have applied equally in a prosecution brought by the CPS.

The guidance is written for witnesses, and E.F. was a defendant, so I rely on it for the general practice and not as a rule that governed her case.

3. Would a ban on private prosecutions have changed the outcome?

No, because in this case a public prosecutor took the decision.

The Committee’s main recommendation is that only public authorities should bring these prosecutions (10). Here the CPS took the case over in December 2013 and continued it (9.13). Its letter of 5 December 2013 said that it had reviewed the case and was satisfied that the evidential stage and the public interest stage of the Full Code Test were met. The United Kingdom told the Committee that the decision was reviewed and approved at multiple senior levels (6.4). The DPP reviewed it again in 2014 and concluded that both stages of the test were met (6.5).

The consequences the Committee relies on follow from being a defendant to this charge, whoever prosecutes. Section 1(4) of the 1992 Act permits reports of the proceedings in a CPS prosecution just as in a private one. The Court of Appeal has held that this covers a complainant’s own trial for perjury or perverting the course of justice, and that whether such reports should be permitted is “a matter for Parliament, not for the court” (R v Beale, paragraphs 13 and 22). The CPS guidance says the same: a defendant charged with perverting the course of justice over a false allegation of a sexual offence “will have no automatic right to anonymity”.

There were also safeguards during the case. The United Kingdom told the Committee that abuse of process was raised before the magistrates and rejected, that the ruling was not challenged, and that no application for a stay was pursued in the Crown Court (footnote 12). It also said that the summons and the CPS’s decision could have been challenged by judicial review (4.1, 4.2). The Committee accepted her father’s argument that these remedies were not realistically available (8.8).

For me there was no other route to a criminal court. The police never investigated my complaint (the DPP’s statement). The police Victims’ Right to Review scheme did not begin until 1 April 2015, and it applies only where a suspect has been interviewed under caution. Parliament preserved the right of private prosecution in section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, and the United Kingdom describes it as “a constitutional safeguard against inaction or partiality by public authorities” (6.10).

4. Was E.F.’s mental health ignored?

No. It was raised in the first weeks of the case and was considered before the CPS decided to continue.

  • On 16 September 2013, five days after the first court hearing, my solicitors wrote to her solicitors asking for medical evidence. Their letter said: “If your client is suffering from any significant mental or physical ill health we would of course need to take this information into account when considering the public interest stage for any on going review of the matter.” No reply was received. The Views do not mention this letter.
  • The CPS made its decision with a psychiatric report before it. The DPP described it as “a very detailed report by a consultant forensic psychiatrist instructed by Ms de Freitas’ legal team”, and said that this doctor’s view was that she “was fit to stand trial”. The United Kingdom told the Committee the same (6.4, 6.5). The CPS’s letter to the court of 27 November 2013 says that its review of the case had included consideration of a lengthy psychiatric report.
  • The DPP reviewed the decision in 2014 and upheld it (6.5). In June 2018 the Attorney General decided not to order an independent inquiry, and said he was satisfied that “it was right for the prosecution to go ahead” (statement of 26 June 2018; 6.8).

The courts have looked at this too. The Coroner ruled that there was no arguable breach of the right to life that would justify examining the CPS’s decisions (6.7). The High Court refused permission to challenge that ruling in March 2016, and again after an oral hearing on 24 May 2016 (2.9). In the March decision (the order of Mr Justice Holroyde of 9 March 2016, claim CO/2664/2015) the judge held that it was not arguable that the Coroner was wrong to conclude that the medical evidence gave the CPS no reason to anticipate a real and immediate risk to her life (paragraph 1 of his reasons). He noted that the CPS had medical evidence, including the evidence relied on by her own representatives, which did not identify any real or immediate risk to her life, and that no representations were made to the CPS in the days immediately before her death that her condition was worsening and that the prosecution was endangering her life (paragraph 5). He also found the submissions in the Coroner’s Acknowledgement of Service persuasive, and said that they provided “a complete answer to the claim” (paragraph 10).

The Coroner’s written submissions in the judicial review, dated July 2015, state: “At no time after that did any of her treating clinicians say that she was unfit to stand trial or at the immediate risk of suicide” (paragraph 44(b)).

Paragraph 9.15 of the Views relies on the CPS’s guidance. The current version says that a suspect’s vulnerabilities, including mental health, “must be properly assessed and taken into account”, and that prosecutors may need to take “proactive steps to obtain medical or other evidence”. The record above is consistent with that. The guidance treats mental health as something to be weighed. It does not treat it as a bar to prosecution.

The Committee’s own test is to defer to national authorities unless their assessment “was affected by prejudice, gender stereotypes, arbitrariness or amounted to a denial of justice” (9.4). Paragraph 9.15 finds none of those things. It says only that the Committee “is not persuaded” that enough weight was given to her vulnerability. Paragraph 9.14 refers to a “heightened duty of care” without saying what more the prosecutors should have done.

The Committee also recommends a rigorous, gender-sensitive assessment of these decisions (10). The CPS guidance already requires one. These cases are reserved to specialist rape prosecutors, the decision must not rest on “myths and stereotypes”, and every decision must be ratified in writing by a Chief Crown Prosecutor.

5. Why was E.F. never interviewed by the police?

Because the police declined to investigate my complaint, although the CPS asked them to.

The Committee notes that the police did not support the prosecution, that E.F. was not interviewed under caution, and that the prosecution relied mainly on material from the private prosecution (9.13). Each of those points is incomplete.

  • The police. A police officer gave a witness statement for the private prosecution, dated 13 August 2013. The police did not investigate my complaint. The DPP said that they “never undertook an investigation into the alleged perverting the course of justice” and so were “not in a position to form a view on whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute”.
  • The interview. A police interview under caution takes place in a police investigation, and there was none. In a letter of 8 October 2013 the CPS said that it could not direct the police to investigate but had asked them to reconsider. In a letter to the court of 13 November 2013 it said that it had met the police in conference and asked them to reconsider, and that they had confirmed their original decision to take no action. The CPS cannot make the police investigate: the Code for Crown Prosecutors says that “prosecutors cannot direct the police or other investigators” (paragraph 3.2 of the January 2013 edition; paragraph 3.3 of the 2018 edition).
  • The evidence. The CPS did not simply adopt my case. E.F.’s lawyers made representations to the CPS before it decided (2.6). In its letter of 13 November 2013 the CPS also said that it had considered a large file of papers from both parties, and that it had obtained further material from the police, including the video-recorded evidence E.F. gave when she made her allegation, which it had viewed. The DPP said the evidence included “text messages and CCTV footage that directly contradicted the account Ms de Freitas gave to the police”. The United Kingdom told the Committee that prosecutors applied gender-sensitive guidance and expressly rejected reliance on rape myths and stereotypes (6.3).

The absence of a police interview was therefore the result of a police decision, which the CPS asked the police to reconsider and had no power to override. An investigation would have gathered evidence capable of helping her defence as well as the prosecution.

The Views also repeat her father’s allegation that I contacted E.F.’s colleagues (2.6). That is an allegation, not a finding. Two of her colleagues gave witness statements for the prosecution.

6. Has any court found that the prosecution caused her death?

No.

The Coroner ruled that there was no arguable breach of the right to life that would justify examining the CPS’s decisions (6.7). The High Court twice refused permission to challenge that ruling in 2016 (2.9). In June 2018 the Attorney General declined to order a fresh inquest, a public inquiry or an independent review (6.8). The Views themselves make no finding on what led to her death.

The High Court’s order of 9 March 2016 records that the Coroner accepted that she was vulnerable, and that he was reported to have said that her impending prosecution was “a very significant stressor” at the time of her death (paragraph 1). That is different from a finding that it caused her death, and no court has made such a finding.

The Views nonetheless leave that impression. They record without comment her father’s claim that the trial process drove her to take her own life (3.4). They treat the decline in her mental health as the result of the prosecution (9.7, 9.14). They recommend compensation for “material and moral harm” without saying what harm is meant (10). The Committee’s press release places her death beside its findings.

I do not say the Committee decided the point. It did not, and that is the difficulty: the impression is left with no finding to support it.

What happens next

The United Kingdom must send the Committee a written response within six months (11). I have asked the Government to put these points to the Committee, and to state in its response that the Views make no finding on whether the original complaint was true or on what led to her death.

Sources

If you are affected by anything on this page, Samaritans can be contacted free at any time on 116 123 in the UK and Ireland.

Drafted with AI assistance from my instructions and the linked documents. Checked by me. The account and the views are my own.

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